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Abstract:  Given the general interest on the part of governments and educators to teach students 
about citizenship and character, it is worthwhile to examine particular assumptions about virtue, 
including that virtue is a definable thing or an identifiable set of qualities; that it can be observed 
and therefore known; and that it can be taught. Further, given the psychological research in this area 
and its subsequent impact on educational programs and policies, it is important for educators to 
question and contrast such research with the philosophical foundations (also influential on 
educational programs and policies) on which virtue is based. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there 
are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know.  
But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we don’t know.  
 
                                                                 -Donald Rumsfeld, Former Secretary of State, 2002 
  
Despite his notable unpopularity as former U.S. President George W. Bush’s 
Secretary of State, Donald Rumsfeld’s philosophical musings about knowledge (for which he 
received much mockery) are important, and relate to the recent American Educational 
Research Association’s conference theme, non satis scire (to know is not enough). To know is 
not enough but educators might consider a deeper challenge: question what we think we 
know in the first place. Serious consideration of the many “unknown unknowns” in 
education is a worthwhile undertaking and in particular, the possible unknown unknown, 
virtue, warrants further analysis.   
There is interest on the part of governments and educators to teach virtue education 
and character development, generally as a means to help students become good citizens. 
Concerned with the politics of virtue education and character development programs, for 
example, Howard, Berkowitz and Schaeffer (2004) emphasize the importance of such 
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programs thus, 
…[it] comes with the territory of teaching and schooling. It is not a question of whether to 
do character education but rather questions of how consciously and by what methods. The 
political sands will shift and create different contexts. In spite of these changes, character 
education will continue and character educators will continue to grapple with questions of 
how to be our best ethical selves and how best to help students to know, care about, and do 
the right thing (p. 210) 
They argue further that by choosing the profession, educators accept responsibility “…to 
prepare individuals to make ethical judgments and to act on them…to do what one thinks 
ought to be done” (p. 189) and that as educators “…engage in preparing…youth to answer 
and respond to these and difficult personal issues and societal issues, their character 
development takes on growing importance” (p. 189).   
The importance of virtue projects and character education programs have been 
newly emphasized as necessary, now more than ever, given our increasingly inter-dependent 
and global world. The Ontario Ministry of Education (2008), for example, points out this 
importance in Finding Common Ground: Character Development in Ontario Schools, K–12, stressing 
that educators are responsible for “… preparing students to be citizens who have empathy 
and respect for others within our increasingly diverse communities” (p. 2).  Educators are 
further responsible to help students “…understand deeply the importance of civic 
engagement and what it means to be productive citizens in an interdependent world (p. 2). 
Given this interest in teaching students about citizenship, virtues and character, it is 
worthwhile to examine particular assumptions about virtue, including, that it is a definable 
thing or an identifiable set of qualities; that it can be observed and therefore known; and that 
it can be taught. Further, given some of the psychological research in this area and its 
subsequent impact on educational programs and policies, it is important for educators to 
 3 
question and contrast this research with some of the philosophical foundations on which 
virtue is based -- philosophical foundations that are also influential on educational programs 
and policies.  Interestingly though, philosophical foundations and arguments may have less 
sway than evidence-based research (including scientific and psychological research) in 
educational policy. As Biesta (2007) notes,  
[p]roponents of evidence-based education stress that it is about time that educational 
research starts to follow the pattern that has created ‘‘the kind of progressive, systematic 
improvement over time that has characterized successful parts of our economy and society 
throughout the twentieth century, in fields such as medicine, agriculture, transportation, and 
technology” (p. 3) 
Biesta further suggests “…some proponents go as far as to say that any practice not based 
upon scientific knowledge is inferior and should ultimately be banned” (p. 3).  That scientific 
knowledge and research in education is considered superior to other forms of research or 
knowledge cannot be overstated as Biesta concludes that proponents of evidence-based 
education stress that, 
…education ‘‘is too important to allow it to be determined by unfounded opinion, whether 
of politicians, teachers, researchers or anyone else.’’ They call for a culture ‘‘in which 
evidence is valued over opinion’’ and argue that any approach to decision-making that is not 
evidence-based is simply ‘‘pre-scientific’’ (p. 4). 
Considering this context, my purpose here is to explore some understandings of the nature 
of virtue by 1) examining the assumption that it can be observed or known; 2) looking at 
some of the literature that suggests it is observable and identifiable; and 3) discussing the 
implications as they relate to education. 
While we may think we can observe virtue, such an assumption may be grounded on 
particular psychological, scientific perspectives.  Further, the assumption may be counter-
intuitive to our desire to help students value and understand virtue in the first place.  We 
unwittingly perpetuate the assumption when we assert that we can know one is virtuous by 
simply identifying observable, external behaviours.  On the contrary, perhaps the inaccessible, 
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deep interior of another–-what she values, her intentions and her private thoughts are just 
that–-inaccessible, at least to others. The problematic assumption that virtue is observable 
and can be known may be summarized thus:  
Observability is fundamental to knowing;  
Virtue is observable;  
Therefore virtue can be known.  
 
Of significance is that the second premise (virtue is observable) is widely assumed to be the 
case, particularly in education.  It does seem reasonable, however, that we make such an 
assumption, considering the general acceptance of the first premise - that observability is 
fundamental to knowing.  So is observability, in fact, fundamental to knowing? The 
assumption that it is, appears justifiable, at least at first. 
Consider a high school student, for example, who is asked to find out the 
temperature at which water boils.  She will observe and reasonably conclude that because the 
thermometer reads 212 degrees at the same time as the water begins to boil, she can 
therefore know (based on her observations) that water boils at 212 degrees.  We could say 
that she knows it because she observes it. The problem occurs when the assumption that you can 
know it because you’ve observed it, is extended beyond the science classroom, and 
erroneously applied to human behaviours, intentions and private, mental deliberations. 
Now consider a different example where one cannot necessarily know something 
based on observation.  A school principal refers a student to a counsellor believing she knows 
that the internal, emotional state of a disruptive, grade 8 student during an opening day, 
school-wide assembly, is one of anger and ill manners. The reason for this assessment is 
based on first-hand, empirical observation that the student shouted obscenities at others and 
resorted to physical violence.  In this context, it seems reasonable for the principal to assert 
knowledge of the individual’s internal state, as evidenced by the observable, rude behaviour.  
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The problem is that the conclusion (that the student is ill-mannered) could be incorrect and 
in fact was incorrect, in this particular case.  As was later learned from the counsellor and 
student’s parents, the principal, the staff and student body were all unaware that the student 
suffered from Tourette’s Syndrome.  Not only was the student acting involuntarily, he was not 
being intentionally rude.  Sufferers of Tourette’s Syndrome may, in reality, feel no malice or 
anger toward others at all when outwardly exhibiting an often embarrassing, socially-
unacceptable tic.  Of importance in this example is the problem of observing what another 
values or intends at any particular time.  Further, unlike the science student example where 
she apparently knows it because she observes it, the Tourettes example shows how the principal 
and others observed it but clearly didn’t know it. These distinctions are crucial as they highlight 
the need to examine assumptions made about observability, knowability and teachability. 
Can Virtue Be Observed? 
 
Any review of the literature on virtue is sure to allude to the works of Plato and 
Aristotle - both of whom may have argued that virtue is not necessarily observable or 
knowable by others.  In particular, Socrates seems to question the very nature of virtue.  
Specifically he questions whether or not virtue can be defined; whether it is one thing or 
many; whether it is a type of knowledge; and if it can be taught.  At the end of the dialogue 
in Meno, for example, these questions remain unanswered, as Socrates notes that we can 
neither know what virtue is nor what it resembles (Hamilton & Cairns, 1961).  
Aristotle’s work similarly suggests virtue may not be observable in any empirical sense, 
and that outward actions and behaviours do not necessarily tell us anything about what 
someone is feeling and thinking.  Actions and behaviours do not necessarily tell us anything 
about whether or not someone is virtuous.  Assessing the observability problem in Aristotle’s 
descriptions of virtue, Geoffrey Sadler (2010) asserts that, 
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[i]t is not enough that actions be in accordance with the virtues for them to be done…The 
acting person must be in a certain condition…they must be aware of what they are 
doing…While actions (at least many of them) are empirically observable, states of character 
are not observable with the same ease (p. 13). 
Some of the research in the fields of psychology and education, however, suggest that states 
of character or virtuous behaviours are definable, observable and even teachable.  A famous 
study in “deindividuation,” still studied today in introductory psychology classes, was 
conducted by psychologist David Dodd (1985). Dodd’s study supposedly reveals that when 
otherwise “good college students” are given the promise of anonymity and the promise they 
will not be held responsible for their actions, they tend to act in a more antisocial manner 
and a less prosocial manner than prisoners.  Asked to anonymously respond in writing as to 
what they would do if they were not held responsible for their actions, students responded 
that they would steal, cheat and in some cases even kill.  Dodd’s findings, while not intended 
to do so, nonetheless support the idea that virtuous, or in this case, non-virtuous 
characteristics or actions can be identified and observed - in this case by a researcher posing 
hypotheticals. Of further interest in Dodd’s research, is that there can be a clear discrepancy 
between what a person may privately think, intend or value (stealing, cheating, killing) and 
their outward, observable behaviour – as of course none of Dodd’s well-mannered and well-
behaved college students in fact committed the acts of which they wrote. Similar studies in 
psychology were also conducted by psychologist Philip Zimbardo (1970), which support 
Dodd’s idea that when we believe we have anonymity and are not being observed, we are 
more likely to act and comport ourselves in an unvirtuous manner.  
More recently, psychologist David DeSteno (2006), in a study funded by the 
National Science Foundation, found that when people feel gratitude, they are more generous 
and act virtuously by giving money to others.  The experiment included 85 subjects who had to 
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undergo a trying task and half of the subjects were instructed to perform the task again due 
to a computer problem.  At the precise moment of the so-called computer problem, one of 
the researchers would tell these subjects that the computer problem could be fixed (and did 
so), providing relief and gratitude to these subjects, since they did not have to complete the 
task a second time.  Following this part of the experiment, both the experimental and 
control group played a game where participants had to chose a dollar amount to give to each 
other.  DeSteno describes how the participants, who felt grateful from the computer glitch 
experience, gave more generously – acted more virtuously – by giving 25% more than the 
control group members did.  The conclusion then is that virtue (or virtuous behaviour) can 
be observed and known – namely, that knowledge of another’s virtue can be discovered 
through simply observing outward action or behaviour such as the act of giving generously 
to others. 
Psychologists Chris Peterson and Martin Seligman (2004) also suggest that virtue is 
outwardly observable, as they identify virtues and character strengths (including wisdom, 
courage, justice, etc.).  They argue that if a person values these virtues and practices them, a 
person will ultimately achieve success or excellence.  Peterson, Seligman & Park (2004) 
further suggest that, 
Character strengths can be defined as positive traits reflected in thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors. They exist in degrees and can be measured as individual differences. We speculate 
that these are grounded in biology through an evolutionary process that selected for these 
predispositions toward moral excellence as means of solving the important tasks necessary 
for survival of the species (p. 603). 
The corporate world has generally adopted the position that virtue can be outwardly 
observed and identified, as Dyck and Kleysen’s (2001) study suggests.  In their work, 
Aristotle’s Virtues And Management Thought: An Empirical Exploration Of An Intergrative Pedagogy, 
these researchers observed management students to assess whether they could be taught to 
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notice in others Artistotelian virtues. In their conclusions, Dyck and Kleysen suggest that 
their findings offer empirical evidence that virtues can in fact be identified and observed in 
management behaviour.  As they note, 
Our findings offer preliminary empirical support for the contention that Aristotle's virtues 
provide a useable framework for integrating moral concerns into a holistic view of 
management. Our results, that students are able to observe the virtues in actual managerial 
behavior, encourage their further use and development as a framework for education in 
management theory and business ethics (p. 570). 
The assumption that virtue is identifiable and observable is also reflected in some of the 
educational literature.  Catherine Fallona (2000) in her work, Manner In Teaching: A Study In 
Observing And Interpreting Teachers’ Moral Virtues, suggests there are moral virtues that are 
observable in teachers.   Focusing on assessing “manner,” Fallona measures the Artistotelian 
virtues of bravery, friendliness, wit, mildness, magnificence, magnanimity, honor, generosity, 
temperance, truthfulness and justice. Conducting her research in a middle school in Arizona, 
Fallona argues that,  
…from detailed cases, one is able to see how a particular teacher expresses moral virtue in 
her practice…Through interviews, a card sort, observations, and video recordings, I gained 
an understanding of manner in teaching as the expression of moral virtue...Once I was able 
to identify teacher behavior that was reflective of virtue, I made focused observations. The 
focus of the observations was on the teacher's expressions of moral virtue (p. 7-9). 
Though Fallona later mentions the difficulty of observing some virtues, there is nonetheless 
an assumption that virtues can be observed.  Distinguishing between “visible” virtues and 
“invisible” virtues, Fallona still contends that even the invisible virtues just require a high 
degree of interpretation.   Of the visible virtues, Fallona writes, “…the moral virtues whose 
expression are most observable are friendliness, wit, bravery, honor, mildness, generosity, 
and magnificence” (p. 9) and that “…these virtues can be observed in a teacher's actions, 
and thus require the least amount of interpretation” (p. 9).  Of the invisible virtues, Fallona 
notes that “other virtues are not so visible. Thus, seeing them…requires high degrees of 
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interpretation…magnanimity, temperance, truthfulness, and justice fall into this category (p. 
10). Fallona’s conclusions, like those of the researchers in psychology, suggest that virtue is 
not only observable in others, but can be quantified and in some sense, empirically known. 
Can Virtue Be Taught? 
As noted earlier, Socrates, in Meno, questions whether virtue is something that can be 
defined or taught.  His student, Plato, author of the “Ring of Gyges” story from Republic , 
however, ironically offers several teachable moments on virtue. Through the use of the 
story, students might be given the opportunity to question and explore, as Socrates did, the 
same assumptions made about virtue. If given a ring that makes you invisible, would you 
behave any differently than if you were visible?  Would you steal?  Would you harm others; 
Would you break the law?  After all, you couldn’t be caught – you’re invisible, so why be 
virtuous? The story asks one to consider what one does when no one is watching and thus 
opens up important pedagogical opportunities.  It is often a revelation to students, for 
example, that the privacy of their emails, Facebook comments and blog entries are actually 
illusory privacy.  Perhaps this illusion of privacy and anonymity might explain the less than 
virtuous behaviour of some, but it does seem legitimate for students to innocently inquire: 
why be virtuous if no one can see me or if I am not rewarded for being virtuous?  Plato’s 
powerful story, though a dialogue about justice, nonetheless, has implications for 
understanding what it is to be a virtuous person.  Further, given the impact of technology on 
education and the subsequent social networking generation, educators might see a benefit in 
using social networking dilemmas as a bridge or a lens through which to question the 
assumption that virtue in another is observable and knowable. Additionally, teaching works 
like Plato’s “Ring of Gyges” story can encourage students to recognize their own perhaps 
misguided understanding of privacy with respect to social networking, and how this social 
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reality may relate to virtue.  
Some of the research, particularly in the area of psychology, suggests that virtue is 
something that can be identified, quantified, observed and known.  As suggested at the 
beginning of this paper, however, given that research is often used to justify educational 
programs, initiatives and policies, it might be important for educators to examine some of 
the underlying assumptions that such research may contain. Further, as a related but more 
general point, educators might want to question why observability and measurability are so 
crucial to their pedagogies in the first place. As Heesoon Bai (2012) suggests, focusing on the 
observable and measurable is a testament to our dependence on the empirical, scientific 
paradigm, where  
…matters of the immeasurable have been either dismissed out of hand as irrelevant or fuzzy 
and touchy-feely, or they have been objectified and operationalized, and turned into 
some kind of measurable and even predictable phenomena…the empiricist 
worldview neither includes nor attends to the unknowable, unnamable, unseen, 
immeasurable, uncertain, and unpredictable” (p. 5-6). 
 
Perhaps virtue is better understood in this context - the unseen, the immeasurable, and the 
unknown. 
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